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I. INTRODUCTION 
Workers’ compensation statutes were first enacted in the 
United States during the early twentieth century.1  Minnesota 
 
       †  J.D. Candidate 2008, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., History, with 
Honors and Distinction, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 2005. 
 1. 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
LAW § 2.07 (2006) [hereinafter LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW]. 
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enacted its first workers’ compensation statute in 1913.2  These 
statutes established a mechanism for compensating victims of work-
related injuries.3  Such injuries, on occasion, may appear to arise as 
a result of a coemployee’s actions.4  In such cases, an often 
problematic issue is the question of when, if ever, in a workers’ 
compensation system the injured employee should be allowed to 
recover from the coemployee.5  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
directly confronted this issue in Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football 
Club, LLC.6 
In deciding Stringer, the court faced an intersection of 
common-law tort liability and Minnesota’s system of workers’ 
compensation.7  In its decision, the court added a requirement to 
the existing test for determining when a coemployee may be liable 
for another employee’s injuries.8  The new requirement is that in 
order for a coemployee to owe a personal duty to the injured 
employee, the coemployee must also have “acted outside the course 
and scope of employment.”9  Stringer suggests that the window for 
coemployee liability will continue to be very narrow.10 
This note first examines the historical development of 
coemployee liability under Minnesota’s workers’ compensation 
system.11  It then outlines the facts of Stringer and details the court’s 
decision.12  Next, it provides an analysis of the Stringer decision.13  
 
 2. Act of Apr. 24, 1913, ch. 467, 1913 Minn. Laws 675 (codified at MINN. 
STAT. §§ 176.001–.862 (2004)). 
 3. Paul Raymond Gurtler, The Workers’ Compensation Principle: A Historical 
Abstract of the Nature of Workers’ Compensation, 9 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 285, 285 
(1989). 
 4. See, e.g., Meintsma v. Loram Maint. of Way, Inc., 684 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 
2004) (employee sustained injuries from “birthday spankings” given by 
coemployees); Ackerman v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 435 N.W.2d 835 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1989) (employee killed when struck by coemployee’s vehicle); Kohler v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 416 N.W.2d 469 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (employee 
passenger injured in vehicle accident allegedly resulting from coemployee driver’s 
negligence). 
 5. See generally 6 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 1, § 
111.03 (discussing varying jurisdictional approaches to accommodating common-
law tort liability against coemployees in workers’ compensation systems). 
 6. 705 N.W.2d 746 (Minn. 2005). 
 7. Id. at 748. 
 8. Id. at 757–58.  See also infra Part III. 
 9. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 758. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
2
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This note concludes that Stringer’s addition to the test for 
coemployee liability is grounded in well-established precedent and 
that the addition is important for maintaining the integrity of 
Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system.14 
II. HISTORY 
A. Origins of Workers’ Compensation Law 
The emergence of workers’ compensation law coincided with 
the rise of industrialization in nineteenth-century Europe.15  With 
mechanization and the pressures for greater and faster production 
during the early industrial era came a marked increase in 
workplace injuries.16  Employees injured at the workplace typically 
sought to recover directly from their employers.17 
Under the system of common-law tort liability, injured 
employees could not easily recover for work-related injuries from 
their employers.18  Injured employees had difficulty because 
employers were entitled to three potent defenses: contributory 
negligence, the fellow servant exception to vicarious liability, and 
assumption of risk.19  Armed with these defenses, employers were 
 
 14. See infra Parts IV, V. 
 15. Gurtler, supra note 3, at 286–87. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See 1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 1, § 2.03 
(explaining the early remedies available to employees who suffered injuries at the 
workplace). 
 18. THE MINNESOTA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DESKBOOK, § 2.1 (Jay T. 
Hartman & Thomas D. Mottaz eds., 3d ed. 2001).  Generally, an injured 
employee’s only cause of action was based on the employer’s alleged negligence.  
Gurtler, supra note 3, at 286.  An employer would typically only be found negligent 
if the employee could demonstrate that the employer failed in some manner to 
provide reasonably safe equipment or machines in the workplace.  Id. 
 19. 1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 1, § 2.03.  These 
three common-law defenses for employers were known as the “unholy trinity” 
defenses.  Gurtler, supra note 3, at 287 (citing W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (5th ed. 1984)).  Under the contributory negligence 
defense, an injured employee could not recover from his employer if the 
employee was negligent in any manner, regardless of whether the employer was 
negligent.  Id. at 286.  Under the fellow servant defense, an injured employee 
could not recover from his employer if the employer could demonstrate that a 
fellow employee’s negligence caused the injury at issue.  Id.  Under the 
assumption of risk defense, an injured employee could not recover from his 
employer if the employee was free to avoid a potentially dangerous workplace 
(regardless of the employee’s knowledge).  Id. at 286–87. 
3
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rarely required to compensate employees for work-related 
injuries.20 
As the number of work-related injuries increased, the need for 
a more equitable system of compensating injured employees 
became greater.21  Faced with the imbalance between the rights of 
employers and the rights of employees, efforts emerged to 
strengthen the rights of injured employees.22  Courts mounted early 
reform efforts, but the task of reform was ultimately led by 
legislation.23  In 1884, Germany enacted the first workers’ 
compensation law, and soon thereafter Great Britain enacted 
workers’ compensation legislation in 1897.24 
These early workers’ compensation acts established what 
would become the fundamental principles of workers’ 
compensation law.25  Workers’ compensation is based on a 
compromise between employers and employees.26  The general 
quid pro quo is that employees are guaranteed compensation from 
their employers for any work-related injuries regardless of fault, 
and in exchange for providing such compensation, employers 
cannot be held liable in common-law actions brought by employees 
concerning work-related injuries.27  In effect, employees can work 
 
 20. See Gurtler, supra note 3, at 286–87. 
 21. MINNESOTA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DESKBOOK, supra note 18, § 2.1. 
 22. See 1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 1, § 2.04. 
 23. Id.  In general, the courts attempted to limit the scope and effect of the 
“unholy trinity” defenses.  See id.  But these efforts had little impact.  Id.  Perhaps 
the most significant advancement in employee rights forwarded by the courts was 
the adoption of the vice-principal rule.  Gurtler, supra note 3, at 287.  This rule 
prevented employers from delegating their common-law duties, such as providing 
a reasonably safe workplace, to an injured employee’s coemployee.  Id. 
 24. See Gurtler, supra note 3, at 288–92; 1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
LAW, supra note 1, §§ 2.05–.06.  There is perhaps no single reason why Germany 
and Great Britain ultimately developed and enacted workers’ compensation 
legislation during the last years of the nineteenth century.  But in each instance, it 
appears that placating an increasingly discontented workforce by expanding 
employee rights and the emerging perception that taking greater care for workers 
was in fact good business were particularly significant.  See Gurtler, supra note 3, at 
288–92; 1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 1, §§ 2.05–.06. 
 25. See Gurtler, supra note 3, at 290–91. 
 26. See 1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 1, § 1.03 
(explaining the basic principles of workers’ compensation systems). 
 27. Karst v. F.C. Hayer Co., 447 N.W.2d 180, 183–84 (Minn. 1989); 
MINNESOTA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DESKBOOK, supra note 18, § 1.1.  However, 
employers are not exempt from common-law tort liability to injured employees if 
the employer willfully or intentionally injured the employee.  See Gunderson v. 
Harrington, 632 N.W.2d 695, 702 (Minn. 2001) (citing Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 
Minn. 470, 472, 231 N.W. 233, 234 (1930) (recognizing the intentional injury 
4
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without worry that they will not be compensated for work-related 
injuries, while employers can operate without worry of being 
subject to burdensome personal injury lawsuits for every incidence 
of work-related injury.  There is thus incentive for employees and 
employers alike to support a workers’ compensation system. 
B. Workers’ Compensation Law in Minnesota 
The model of workers’ compensation law that developed in 
Europe was adopted throughout the United States during the early 
twentieth century.28  The compromise between employees and 
employers at the heart of European workers’ compensation systems 
also formed the foundation of workers’ compensation law in the 
United States.29  This compromise is the fundamental basis of 
Minnesota’s Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) as adopted in 
1913.30 
Once enacted, the provisions of the Act became the exclusive 
remedy for victims of work-related injuries.31  But following 
implementation of the Act, issues of coemployee liability quickly 
arose.32  In such cases, the question was when, if ever, an employee 
should be allowed to recover for work-related injuries from a 
 
exception in Minnesota)). 
 28. See Gurtler, supra note 3, at 292–93 (discussing the historical development 
of workers’ compensation law in the United States); 1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 1, §§ 2.07–.08 (detailing the emergence of workers’ 
compensation law in the United States).  Among the first states to explore and 
then enact workers’ compensation legislation were Connecticut, Illinois, Montana, 
New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin.  Gurtler, supra note 3, at 293.  By 1920, virtually 
every state had adopted some form of workers’ compensation legislation.  1 
LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 1, § 2.07. 
 29. See Gurtler, supra note 3, at 292–93. 
 30. See Act of Apr. 24, 1913, ch. 467, 1913 Minn. Laws 675 (codified at MINN. 
STAT. §§ 176.001–.862 (2005)); see also Wicken v. Morris, 527 N.W.2d 95, 99 (Minn. 
1995) (citing Boryca v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar, 487 N.W.2d 876, 879 n.3 (Minn. 
1992)); Foley v. Honeywell, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Minn. 1992). 
 31. MINNESOTA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DESKBOOK, supra note 18, § 2.1. 
 32. See, e.g., Behr v. Soth, 170 Minn. 278, 212 N.W. 461 (1927).  In Behr, both 
plaintiff and defendant were firemen employed by the city of Albert Lea.  Id. at 
279, 212 N.W. at 461.  En route to a fire, plaintiff, who was riding on a fire truck, 
and defendant, who was driving another vehicle to the fire, collided at a street 
intersection.  Id.  At issue was whether plaintiff could recover workers’ 
compensation from the city and personal injury damages from defendant.  See id. 
at 283, 212 N.W. at 463.  The Minnesota Supreme Court held that plaintiff could 
elect to receive either workers’ compensation or personal injury damages, but 
plaintiff could not receive both.  Id.  For a discussion of Behr in Stringer, see infra 
Part III. 
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coemployee under the workers’ compensation system.33 
In 1975, the Minnesota Supreme Court faced the issue of 
coemployee liability in Dawley v. Thisius.34  At issue in Dawley was 
whether the estate of an employee who was killed during the course 
of his employment could bring a negligence action against the 
general manager of the decedent’s employer.35  The court noted 
that although the Act provided the exclusive remedy for work-
related injuries, injured employees may in certain circumstances 
bring a negligence action against a coemployee for the 
coemployee’s negligence in causing the injuries.36 
Thus, the narrower question in Dawley was in what specific 
circumstances of negligence should an injured employee be 
allowed to recover against a coemployee.37  The court held that a 
coemployee will not be liable for an employee’s work-related 
injuries unless the injuries were the result of the coemployee’s 
breaching a “personal duty” to the employee.38  In order for a 
personal duty to exist, the court explained that the coemployee 
 
 33. See, e.g., Behr, 170 Minn. at 280–84, 212 N.W. at 461–63.  Workers’ 
compensation law is premised on the notion that the cost of work-related injuries 
to employees should be absorbed by employers (e.g., through workers’ 
compensation insurance) and passed along to consumers in the price of the 
product.  Arens v. Hanecy, 269 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn. 1978) (citing Eicholz v. 
Shaft, 166 Minn. 339, 342, 208 N.W. 18, 19 (1926)).  The general concern 
associated with allowing coemployee liability is that it essentially shifts the costs of 
work-related injuries from the employer and the consumer to the coemployee, 
which defeats the purposes of a workers’ compensation system.  See Wicken, 527 
N.W.2d at 99; Peterson v. C.W. Kludt, 317 N.W.2d 43, 48 (Minn. 1982). 
 34. 304 Minn. 453, 456, 231 N.W.2d 555, 557 (1975).  In Dawley, plaintiff’s 
husband died from injuries he suffered at his workplace after he fell into a dip 
tank filled with a caustic detergent solution.  Id. at 453, 231 N.W.2d at 556.  
Plaintiff brought a negligence action against the general manager of her 
husband’s employer for damages stemming from her husband’s death.  Id. at 454, 
231 N.W.2d at 556.  Plaintiff claimed that defendant, who had overall 
responsibility for the day-to-day operations at her husband’s workplace, failed to 
provide a safe work environment.  Id. at 454, 231 N.W.2d at 556–57. 
 35. Id. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d at 557.  See supra note 34 and accompanying 
text. 
 36. Dawley, 304 Minn. at 455, 231 N.W.2d at 557 (citing Behr, 170 Minn. at 
278, 212 N.W. at 461). 
 37. See id. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d at 557. 
 38. Id. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 557.  The court explained the “personal duty” 
requirement: “A co-employee may be held liable when, through personal fault as 
opposed to vicarious fault, he breaches a duty owed to plaintiff . . . .  He must have 
a personal duty towards the injured plaintiff, breach of which has caused plaintiff’s 
damage.”  Id.  Further, the court explained that the breach of the duty must be 
based on “personal fault” and cannot arise out of the coemployee’s “general 
administrative responsibility for some function of his employment . . . .”  Id. 
6
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must have taken direct action toward the employee or have 
directed others to do so.39  The court ultimately held in favor of 
defendant, explaining that providing a safe workplace is a duty of 
the employer, not a general manager.40  Therefore, the defendant 
never owed a “personal duty” to the plaintiff’s husband.41 
Following Dawley, the Minnesota Legislature addressed the 
issue of coemployee liability.42  In 1977, the Minnesota Legislature 
created the Workers’ Compensation Study Commission (WCSC) to 
formulate possible changes to the Act that might reduce the 
increasing costs of workers’ compensation.43  The WCSC’s findings 
and recommendations, based on nearly two years of study, were 
taken under consideration by the 1979 Minnesota Legislature.44 
During the 1979 extra session, the legislature adopted a series 
of amendments to the Act based on the WCSC’s report.45  The 1979 
amendments represented perhaps the most sweeping changes 
made to the Act since its adoption in 1913.46  Among the numerous 
reforms, the legislature outlined a narrow window in which 
coemployee liability may exist.47  Specifically, the legislature added 
 
 39. Id.  The court explained that “[t]he acts of negligence for which a co-
employee may be held liable must be acts constituting direct negligence toward 
the plaintiff, tortious acts in which he participated, or which he specifically 
directed others to do.”  Id. (citing Steele v. Eaton, 285 A.2d 749 (Vt. 1971)). 
 40. Id. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 557.  The court further noted that while 
providing a safe workplace is an employer’s duty, “the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act precludes an action against the employer for its alleged breach of duty.”  Id. at 
456, 231 N.W.2d at 558.  Under the Act, in such circumstances where an unsafe 
workplace causes injury to an employee, the employer is obligated to pay workers’ 
compensation to the injured employee.  See MINNESOTA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
DESKBOOK, supra note 18, § 1.1. 
 41. Dawley, 304 Minn. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 558. 
 42. See Jay Y. Benanav, Workers’ Compensation Amendments of the 1979 Minnesota 
Legislature, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 743, 743 (1980); Note, The Minnesota Workers’ 
Compensation Study Commission: Its Impact upon the 1979 Amendments, 6 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 783, 783 (1980). 
 43. Note, supra note 42, at 786.  Throughout the early 1970s, the cost of 
workers’ compensation for employers, particularly in terms of workers’ 
compensation insurance, increased significantly.  Id.  A major reason for the cost 
increases was a series of legislative actions that greatly increased workers’ 
compensation benefits for injured employees.  Id. at 787 n.15.  Such costs had 
increased so much for Minnesota employers in comparison to neighboring states 
that these increases became a “business climate” issue during the 1978 elections.  
Id. at 786. 
 44. See id. at 791. 
 45. Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1256 (codified at 
MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5(c) (2004)); see Benanav, supra note 42, at 744. 
 46. See Benanav, supra note 42, at 744. 
 47. See Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 31, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Session 1256, 
7
Krco: Torts—Narrowing the Window: Refining the Personal Duty Requiremen
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
10. KRCO - RC.DOC 2/27/2007  6:05:56 PM 
746 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:2 
language that barred coemployee liability unless an employee’s 
work-related injuries were the result of a coemployee’s “gross 
negligence.”48  In narrowing the window in which coemployee 
liability may exist, the legislature followed the WCSC rationale that 
freely allowing coemployee liability for mere simple negligence 
would defeat the integrity and purposes of the workers’ 
compensation system.49 
In 1995, the Minnesota Supreme Court again confronted the 
issue of coemployee liability in Wicken v. Morris.50  Similar to Dawley, 
at issue in Wicken was whether the estates of two employees who 
were killed during the course of their employment could bring a 
negligence action against the production manager of the 
decedents’ employer.51  In analyzing this issue under Minnesota 
workers’ compensation law, the court recognized that its analysis 
must take into account the precedent of Dawley and the 1979 
amendment to the Act.52 
In deciding Wicken, the court established a two-prong test for 
determining when a coemployee may be liable for an employee’s 
 
1272 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5(c) (2004)); Benanav, supra note 
42, at 764. 
 48. Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 31.  The added language concerning 
coemployee liability read as follows: “A co-employee working for the same 
employer is not liable for a personal injury incurred by another employee unless 
the injury resulted from the gross negligence of the co-employee or was 
intentionally inflicted by the co-employee.”  Id.  The coemployee liability 
amendment enacted by the 1979 Minnesota Legislature remains in effect and has 
not been modified.  See MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5(c) (2004). 
 49. Benanav, supra note 42, at 764.  In its report to the legislature, the WCSC 
explained that allowing an employee injured at his workplace to sue a coemployee 
“for negligence and receive a portion of any recovery which is less than the total 
workers’ compensation benefits due, and all of the excess, while the employer is 
reimbursed from the recovery for any workers’ compensation benefits paid . . . 
tends to shift tort liability from employer to fellow employee in a manner never 
intended by the workers’ compensation system.”  Id. (quoting MINNESOTA 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION STUDY COMMISSION, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA 
LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNOR, 41 (1979)). 
 50. 527 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn. 1995).  In Wicken, plaintiffs’ husbands were 
killed as a result of an explosion while, as part of their employment, they were 
attending a fire intended to dispose of a blasting agent manufactured by their 
employer.  Id. at 97.  Plaintiffs brought a negligence action against the production 
manager of their husbands’ employer for damages stemming from their husbands’ 
deaths.  Id.  Plaintiffs claimed that the production manager breached a personal 
duty owed to his coemployees—plaintiffs’ husbands.  Id.  Plaintiffs specifically 
alleged that the production manager, in his haste to complete the fire, 
fraudulently obtained a permit to allow the fire.  Id. 
 51. Id. at 98. 
 52. Id. 
8
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work-related injuries.53  The first prong, adopted from Dawley, is 
that the coemployee must have breached a personal duty to the 
employee.54  The second prong, adopted from the 1979 
amendment to the Act, is that the employee’s injuries must have 
arisen from the coemployee’s gross negligence.55 
Under this test, the court held in favor of defendant, 
explaining that plaintiffs failed to show that defendant breached a 
personal duty to the decedents.56  In holding in favor of defendant, 
the court emphasized the importance of maintaining the integrity 
of Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system.57  Here, the court 
was particularly concerned about the consequences of allowing 
coemployee liability when the coemployee took no direct action 
toward the injured employee.58  Wicken’s two-prong test was the 
existing framework for determining coemployee liability when 
Stringer commenced in 2001. 
III. THE STRINGER CASE 
A. Facts 
Korey Stringer, a football player for the Minnesota Vikings, 
died of heat stroke on August 1, 2001 during the Vikings’ summer 
training camp.59  The training camp began on Monday, July 30, 
2001.60  The weather for the first week of training camp was 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  As the court explained the first prong of its test for coemployee 
liability, “First, the injured employee must establish that the co-employee had a 
personal duty toward the employee, the breach of which resulted in the 
employee’s injury, and that the activity causing the injury was not part of the co-
employee’s general administrative responsibilities.”  Id. (citing Dawley v. Thisius, 
304 Minn. 453, 455, 231 N.W.2d 555, 557 (1975)). 
 55. Id.  The court explained the second prong of its test for determining 
coemployee liability by directly quoting the 1979 amendment to the act.  Id.  See 
MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5(c) (1992).  See also supra note 48. 
 56. Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  As the court explained, “To hold otherwise, permitting co-employee 
liability when harm results however indirectly from the carrying out of 
administrative obligations incident to work responsibilities would eviscerate the 
fundamental purpose of the workers’ compensation laws.”  Id. 
 59. Stringer v. Minn. Viking Football Club, LLC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Minn. 
2005).  The 2001 Vikings’ summer training camp was held in Mankato, Minnesota.  
Id. 
 60. Id. at 749. 
9
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predicted to be abnormally hot and humid.61  During the evening 
of Sunday, July 29, the night before training camp began, Vikings 
players attended a team meeting at which they were warned about 
overexertion in high heat and were instructed to stay well hydrated 
during the upcoming practices.62 
The first day of camp, July 30, 2001, was a day of high heat and 
humidity.63  During the course of the afternoon practice on July 30, 
Stringer vomited three times.64  After vomiting for the third time 
during practice, Stringer was brought by Vikings head athletic 
trainer Charles Barta to an on-field medical trailer to “cool down” 
and “take it easy.”65  Already in the trailer were Fred Zamberletti, 
coordinator of Vikings medical services, and Paul Osterman, an 
assistant trainer.66  Stringer was given fluids and was instructed to 
rest but was never medically examined.67 
The second day of camp, July 31, 2001, was another day of 
high heat and humidity.68  During the morning of July 31, Stringer 
participated in a team practice in which the players wore full pads 
and helmets.69  Shortly after the morning practice, Stringer 
dropped to his knees, fell to the ground, and lay on his back with 
his hands over his head.70 
Stringer was brought to the on-field medical trailer by 
 
 61. See id. at 750. 
 62. Id. at 748.  The Vikings players were cautioned about the heat and proper 
hydration by Charles Barta, the Vikings’ head athletic trainer.  Id. at 748–49.  At 
the meeting, the players received only oral instruction and did not receive any 
written instructions concerning prevention of heat-related illnesses.  Id. at 749. 
 63. Id. at 749.  The heat index on the first day of camp was 109°F.  Id. 
 64. Id.  During the morning of July 30, Stringer told Barta that he had an 
upset stomach.  Id.  Aware that Stringer had suffered from heat-related illnesses in 
previous training camps, Barta gave Stringer an antacid for his stomach and a 
sports drink with an extra electrolyte supplement to guard against dehydration.  
Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  At the time of Stringer’s death, though Osterman was employed by 
the Vikings as an assistant trainer, he was not yet officially certified or registered as 
an athletic trainer.  Id. at n.3.  Osterman had, however, completed a four-year 
degree program and other necessary requirements for certification and 
registration.  Id.  Osterman was not officially certified as an athletic trainer until 
August 31, 2001, and not officially registered until January 12, 2002.  Id. 
 67. Id. at 749. 
 68. Id. at 750. 
 69. Id.  When the July 31 morning practice began at 8:45 a.m., the heat index 
was already approximately 90°F.  Id. 
 70. Id. 
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss2/2
10. KRCO - RC.DOC 2/27/2007  6:05:56 PM 
2007] STRINGER v. MINNESOTA VIKINGS 749 
Osterman.71 
Inside the trailer, Osterman gave Stringer fluids as Stringer lay 
cooling on the trailer floor.72  A golf cart was summoned to escort 
Stringer from the on-field trailer to off-field training facilities.73  
When the golf cart arrived, Stringer became unresponsive as 
Osterman and athletic intern D.J. Kearney attempted to raise 
Stringer from the trailer floor.74  Zamberletti was called to the on-
field trailer to assess Stringer’s condition.75  In the trailer, 
Zamberletti, Osterman, and Kearney treated Stringer by 
administering fluids, applying ice towels to Stringer’s body, and by 
placing a plastic bag over Stringer’s mouth to control his 
breathing.76 
Shortly thereafter, Stringer was transported by ambulance to a 
nearby hospital.77  Hospital staff attempted various measures to cool 
Stringer’s body, but Stringer’s condition continued to worsen as 
the night progressed.78 After hours of intensive treatments failed, 
Stringer was pronounced dead during the early morning hours of 
August 1, 2001.79 
B. Procedural History 
Following Korey Stringer’s death, his wife, Kelci Stringer, 
sought recovery.80  As trustee and personal representative of Korey 
Stringer’s estate, Kelci Stringer filed a wrongful death action in 
Hennepin County District Court.81  The Minnesota Vikings and 
multiple individual Vikings employees and physicians, including 
Barta, Osterman, and Zamberletti, were named as defendants in 
the wrongful death suit.82 
 
 71. Id.  Stringer was able to walk to the trailer without assistance.  Id. 
 72. Id. at 751. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 752. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  Zamberletti accompanied Stringer in the ambulance and assisted the 
paramedics in treating Stringer.  Id.  When Stringer was admitted to the hospital, 
his core body temperature was 108.8°F.  Id. at 753. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 748. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 748 n.1.  The wrongful death action asserted thirteen separate 
counts.  Id. at 753.  Count I asserted that Osterman and Zamberletti each owed a 
personal duty to Korey Stringer and that they were each grossly negligent in 
11
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The claims against most of the defendants were dismissed by 
the district court.83  Osterman and Zamberletti were granted 
summary judgment.84  Under the two-prong test for coemployee 
liability established in Wicken, the district court held that neither 
Osterman nor Zamberletti owed Korey Stringer a personal duty.  In 
addition, they were not grossly negligent and were thus entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.85 
Kelci Stringer appealed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to Osterman and Zamberletti.86  The Minnesota Court of 
Appeals affirmed summary judgment for Osterman and 
Zamberletti, but on somewhat different grounds.87  Under the two-
prong test for coemployee liability, the court held that Osterman 
and Zamberletti each owed a personal duty to Korey Stringer, but 
that they were not grossly negligent and were thus entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.88 
Kelci Stringer appealed the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
decision that affirmed summary judgment for Osterman and 
Zamberletti.89  Specifically, Kelci Stringer petitioned the Minnesota 
Supreme Court for review of whether Osterman and Zamberletti 
were grossly negligent.90  Osterman and Zamberletti then 
petitioned for cross-review of whether they owed a personal duty to 
Korey Stringer.91  The Minnesota Supreme Court granted Kelci 
Stringer’s request for review and Osterman’s and Zamberletti’s 
 
carrying out their personal duty to Stringer.  Id.  More specifically, Count I 
asserted that Osterman and Zamberletti, as Vikings medical staff and trainers, 
each had a personal duty to protect and care for Stringer’s health.  Id. 
 83. Id. at 748 n.1. 
 84. Id. at 753. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC, 686 N.W.2d 545, 548–49 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004).  On appeal, Kelci Stringer contended that the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment to Osterman and Zamberletti based on 
coemployee immunity under Minnesota’s Workers’ Compensation Act.  Id. at 549. 
 87. See id. at 553. 
 88. Id.  The court explained that Osterman and Zamberletti owed a personal 
duty to Stringer because they “undertook direct acts toward Stringer that were not 
pursuant to their employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace.”  Id.  
According to the court, although Osterman and Zamberletti owed a personal duty, 
they were not grossly negligent because they “nevertheless exercised more than a 
scant level of care that did not entirely disregard the particularly adverse 
consequences arising from the symptoms of injury Stringer exhibited.”  Id. 
 89. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 753. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
12
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request for cross-review.92 
C. The Stringer Decision93 
The Minnesota Supreme Court framed the central issue in 
Stringer as “whether Kelci Stringer can show . . . that Vikings’ 
employees Paul Osterman and Fred Zamberletti [coemployees of 
Korey Stringer] are not immune from coemployee liability.”94  The 
court explained that resolution of this issue required answering 
whether the two-prong Wicken test was satisfied.95  In deciding 
Stringer, the court acknowledged that it “must address the 
interaction between common-law tort liability and the workers’ 
compensation system, which has restricted coemployee liability in 
negligence actions.”96 
The primary question in Stringer was whether Osterman’s and 
Zamberletti’s actions were sufficient to create a personal duty 
under the first prong of the Wicken test.97  Under the Dawley 
standard that constituted the first prong of the original Wicken test, 
Osterman and Zamberletti would owe a personal duty to Stringer if 
they took direct action toward him, or if they directed others to do 
so.98  In Stringer, as the court explained, the parties agreed that 
Osterman and Zamberletti took direct action toward Stringer, but 
the parties disagreed as to whether these direct actions created a 
personal duty.99 
In analyzing the questions of coemployee liability at issue in 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Justice Paul H. Anderson authored the majority opinion in Stringer.  Id. at 
748.  Justice Page, a former Minnesota Vikings player, took no part in the 
consideration or decision of the Stringer case.  Id. at 763. 
 94. Id. at 748.  The “coemployee immunity” referred to by the court was, 
according to the majority in Stringer, established by the 1979 amendment to the 
Act.  See id. at 754–55; supra Part II. 
 95. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 754.  See also Wicken v. Morris, 527 N.W.2d 95, 98 
(Minn. 1995); supra Part II. 
 96. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 748. 
 97. Id. at 756. 
 98. See Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98. 
 99. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 756.  Kelci Stringer argued that Osterman’s and 
Zamberletti’s administering of medical aid to Stringer was sufficient to create a 
personal duty.  See id. at 756–57.  Osterman and Zamberletti argued that although 
they took direct action toward Stringer, their actions were a necessary part of their 
job duties.  See id. at 757.  According to Osterman and Zamberletti, their 
administering medical aid to Vikings players (i.e., other Vikings employees) was a 
primary function of their employment and was not sufficient to create a personal 
duty.  See id. 
13
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Stringer, the court focused on the precedents of Dawley and 
Wicken.100  From the outset, the court acknowledged that the facts in 
Stringer were not precisely analogous to the fact patterns in Dawley 
and Wicken.101  Both Dawley and Wicken involved defendant 
coemployees who held managerial positions that did not 
necessarily entail direct contact with other employees.102 
The court recognized that, unlike Dawley and Wicken, 
Osterman’s and Zamberletti’s job duties as Vikings athletic trainers 
and medical staff required direct contact with Vikings players (i.e., 
other Vikings employees).103  Stringer thus presented a novel issue: if 
a coemployee’s job duties require direct contact with other 
employees, would carrying out such job duties be sufficient to 
create a personal duty under the first prong of the Wicken test?  As 
the court explained: 
Because the facts of Dawley and Wicken involved duties not 
directed toward a specific person, we did not discuss 
whether “general administrative responsibility” meant 
only duties of general impact on all employees or whether 
it also includes carrying out work duties, regardless of 
whether the work duties involve direct contact with a 
coemployee, as the respondents [Osterman and 
Zamberletti] contend.104 
The court explained that under Dawley and Wicken, though 
direct action by the coemployee is necessary to create a personal 
duty, direct contact alone is insufficient.105  This is because, as the 
Stringer court stated, an “employee whose job involves direct contact 
with others should not bear inordinate risk for coemployee liability 
for the simple fact of his chosen employment or assigned duties.”106  
The court further explained that in Dawley and Wicken its primary 
concerns “included that the coemployee not be held personally 
 
 100. Id. at 757–58. 
 101. Id. at 756. 
 102. Id.  See also Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98–99; Dawley v. Thisius, 304 Minn. 453, 
455–56, 231 N.W.2d 555, 557–58 (1975). 
 103. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 756. 
 104. Id.  In Dawley, the court explained that in cases where there was a 
question of coemployee liability, “[p]ersonal liability . . . will not be imposed on a 
co-employee because of his general administrative responsibility for some function 
of his employment without more.  He must have a personal duty towards the 
injured plaintiff, breach of which has caused plaintiff’s damage.”  Dawley, 304 
Minn. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 557. 
 105. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 757. 
 106. Id. 
14
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liable for decisions he was required and authorized to make as part 
of his job and that we ‘[maintain] the integrity of the compromise 
between employers and employees’ under workers’ 
compensation.”107  The court noted that it was for these reasons 
that Dawley, and later Wicken, stated that “personal liability . . . will 
not be imposed on a co-employee because of his general 
administrative responsibility for some function of his employment 
without more.”108 
Stringer interpreted Dawley’s and Wicken’s discussions of 
“general administrative responsibility” as “articulat[ing] essentially 
the same concept” as course and scope of employment.109  The 
court explained that “a personal duty necessarily contemplates that 
the coemployee must have acted outside of his or her course and 
scope of employment.”110  Thus, according to Stringer, there is a two-
prong test for establishing a personal duty (the first prong of the 
Wicken test): a coemployee (1) must have taken direct action 
toward the employee or have directed others to do so; and (2) must 
have acted outside the course and scope of his employment.111 
The Stringer court clearly acknowledged that the specific 
phrase “course and scope of employment” was not used in either 
Dawley or Wicken in their discussions of personal duty.112  But the 
court offered justification for adding the “outside the course and 
scope of employment” requirement.113  The court’s primary reason 
for adding the requirement was its deep reservation about allowing 
coemployee liability for decisions and actions that a coemployee is 
required to make as part of his job.114  As the court explained, 
“[a]cting within the course and scope of employment is what brings 
 
 107. Id. at 758 (quoting Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99). 
 108. Id. at 757 (quoting Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98). 
 109. Id. at 758. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 757.  The court defined “scope of employment” as “the field of 
action in which a servant is authorized to act in the master-servant relationship.”  
Id. at 758 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1374 (8th ed. 2004)).  The court 
defined “course of employment” as “[e]vents that occur or circumstances that 
exist as a part of one’s employment; esp., the time during which an employee 
furthers an employer’s goals through employer-mandated directives.”  Id. (quoting 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 378 (8th ed. 2004)). 
 112. Id. at 758. 
 113. See id. at 758–60. 
 114. Id. at 758 (citing Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99) (explaining that “permitting 
co-employee liability when harm results however indirectly from the carrying out 
of administrative obligations incident to work responsibilities would eviscerate the 
fundamental purpose of the workers’ compensation laws”). 
15
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the coemployee within the protection of the workers’ 
compensation system.”115 
The protection to which the court alluded is that under 
Minnesota’s Workers’ Compensation Act, employers are liable for 
any injuries to employees arising out of the course of 
employment.116  Thus, according to Stringer, if an employee’s 
injuries arise out of the decisions or actions of a coemployee acting 
within the course and scope of his employment, the injured 
employee’s exclusive remedy should be workers’ compensation.117  
The court concluded that “adopting a course and scope of 
employment prong is compatible with the purposes of the workers’ 
compensation system” and is necessary for maintaining the system’s 
integrity.118 
Having modified the first prong of the Wicken test, the court 
then applied its new framework for determining coemployee 
liability to the Stringer case.119  The court ultimately determined that 
although Osterman and Zamberletti took direct action toward 
Stringer, they were acting within their course and scope of 
employment.120  As the court explained, “[w]hile in retrospect we 
may want or expect that Osterman and Zamberletti would have 
responded to Stringer’s condition differently, they nonetheless 
were acting within their scope of employment, and any duty they 
had toward Stringer did not exist absent their employment 
status.”121  The court thus held that Osterman and Zamberletti did 
not owe a personal duty to Stringer, and therefore the court did 
not reach the question of gross negligence.122  Based on this 
holding, the court affirmed summary judgment for Osterman and 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. MINN. STAT. § 176.021, subdiv. 1 (2004). 
 117. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 757–58.  The dissent’s primary concern was that 
there is no precedent or basis for the majority’s adoption of the course and scope 
of employment requirement.  Id. at 763.  But the majority dismissed the dissent’s 
argument that Behr rejected a course and scope of employment requirement as an 
overly broad and ultimately incorrect interpretation and reading of Behr.  Id. at 
759.  For detailed discussion of the Stringer dissent, see infra Part III.D. 
 118. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 760. 
 119. See id. at 760–63. 
 120. Id. at 761–62. 
 121. Id. at 762.  The court further explained that “[h]ere, Osterman’s and 
Zamberletti’s obligations to Stringer directly resulted from their employment by 
the Vikings and the Vikings’ efforts to provide a safe workplace for their players.  
The record shows that the purpose for employing trainers was to protect the 
health and safety of the players.”  Id. at 762. 
 122. Id. at 763. 
16
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Zamberletti.123 
D. The Stringer Dissent 
Justice Hanson’s dissent in Stringer stands in stark opposition to 
the majority.124  In short, the dissent concluded that (1) the 
evidence presented demonstrated that Osterman and Zamberletti, 
as a matter of law, owed a personal duty to Korey Stringer, and (2) 
regarding the gross negligence prong, there were genuine issues of 
material fact such that summary judgment for Osterman and 
Zamberletti was inappropriate.125  The dissent’s primary concerns 
centered on the majority’s addition of the “outside the course and 
scope of employment” requirement to the personal duty prong of 
the Wicken test.126 
According to the dissent, in order to establish a personal duty, 
an injured employee should not have to prove that a coemployee 
acted outside the course and scope of his employment.127  The 
dissent pointedly opposed the majority’s interpretation of 
Minnesota’s legislative and judicial precedents concerning 
coemployee liability and personal duty and presented a distinct 
alternative analysis.128 
The dissent began its analysis by outlining the policy 
considerations that Stringer raises.129  At the outset, the dissent 
explained that it shared the majority’s concerns that “unlimited 
coemployee liability might intrude on the compromise reached in 
the workers’ compensation laws between employer and employees, 
and could erode the benefit of the immunity from tort liability that 
is provided to employers.”130  The dissent then outlined the 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 763 (Hanson, J., dissenting).  Justice Meyer 
joined the dissent of Justice Hanson.  Id. 
 125. Id.  In regard to the question of personal duty, the first prong of the 
Wicken test, the dissent explained that, “I would hold that, under our precedent 
interpreting Minnesota’s law of ‘personal duty’ and absent directions to the 
contrary from the legislature, the plaintiff need not prove that the coemployee was 
acting outside the course and scope of his employment, but only that the 
coemployee’s acts were taken directly toward the injured employee and were not 
general actions taken in the performance of the employer’s nondelegable duty to 
provide a safe workplace.”  Id. 
 126. See id. at 763–67. 
 127. Id. at 763; see supra note 125. 
 128. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 763–67. 
 129. Id. at 763–64. 
 130. Id. at 763. 
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arguments in favor of and against narrowing the window of 
coemployee liability in a workers’ compensation system.131  
Ultimately, the dissent concluded that because there are competing 
policy considerations at issue concerning narrowing the window of 
coemployee liability, “any further restrictions on coemployee 
liability should be addressed by the legislature, not by this court.”132 
The dissent then analyzed Minnesota’s legislative history 
relating to coemployee liability to show that there is no basis for the 
majority’s addition of the “outside the course and scope of 
employment” requirement.133  The dissent defined the central issue 
for consideration as “whether Minnesota’s workers’ compensation 
laws expressly eliminate or restrict coemployee liability.”134  
According to the dissent, Minnesota’s Workers’ Compensation Act 
has always been understood to provide immunity from tort liability 
to employers, but not to coemployees.135  The dissent noted that 
when other states have extended immunity to coemployees, such 
states have done so expressly through legislative action.136 
Based on its analysis, the dissent explained that the Minnesota 
legislature has never expressed “any intent to abrogate common 
law coemployee liability.”137  Rather, the dissent explained that 
Minnesota’s Workers’ Compensation Act preserves coemployee 
liability.138  The dissent noted that the Act “preserves the liability of 
 
 131. Id. at 763–64.  Among the arguments for narrowing the window for 
coemployee liability noted by the dissent are that “coemployees could risk serious 
personal liability on a daily basis . . . and coemployee liability might provide the 
employer with a subrogation claim against the employee, shifting the burden for 
compensating workplace injuries from the employer to the employee.”  Id. at 763.  
Among the arguments against narrowing the window for coemployee liability 
noted by the dissent are that “the injured employee is entitled to be fully 
compensated for his injuries by all but the employer; the coemployee tortfeasor 
should not be relieved of the consequences of his wrongdoing; [and] extending 
immunity to the coemployee would encourage fellow employees to neglect their 
duties.”  Id. at 764. 
 132. Id. at 763. 
 133. See id. at 764–65. 
 134. Id. at 764. 
 135. Id.  In discussing immunity provided to employers under the Act, the 
dissent quoted Minnesota Statutes section 176.031 (2004), which stated: “The 
liability of an employer prescribed by this chapter is exclusive and in the place of 
any other liability to such employee, personal representative, surviving spouse, 
parent, any child, dependent, next of kin, or other person entitled to recover 
damages on account of such injury or death.”  Id. 
 136. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 764. 
 137. Id. at 765. 
 138. Id. 
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a ‘third party’ to injured employees.”139  According to the dissent, 
“third party” has been held to include coemployees.140  The dissent 
explained that the 1979 amendment to the Act “confirms that a 
‘third party’ includes a coemployee and that coemployees are not 
covered by the employer’s immunity from tort liability.”141  The 
dissent thus concluded that under the Act there is no coemployee 
immunity, the only restriction on coemployee liability is the 
heightened gross negligence standard, and there is no mention of 
personal duty.142 
Having found no legislative basis for the majority’s addition to 
the personal duty prong of the Wicken test, the dissent then 
analyzed the relevant case law concerning coemployee liability.143  
The dissent conceded that the concept of personal duty in relation 
to coemployee liability originated in previous decisions of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court and not the Minnesota legislature.144  
While the dissent agreed that the personal duty prong is applicable, 
the dissent explained that a major question concerning personal 
duty and coemployee liability is the proper scope of this prong.145 
Based on its analysis of relevant case law, the dissent argued 
that the majority’s addition of the “outside the course and scope of 
employment” requirement is an unwarranted and overly broad 
expansion of the personal duty prong.146  The dissent did not 
dispute the court’s holdings in Dawley or Wicken that established the 
 
 139. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5 (2004)). 
 140. Id. (citing Behr v. Soth, 170 Minn. 278, 283, 212 N.W. 461, 463 (Minn. 
1927)).  For general discussion of Behr, see supra note 32. 
 141. For discussion of the 1979 amendment to the Act, see supra Part II.B.  The 
dissent explained that the amendment provides a “restriction of third-party 
liability for a coemployee.”  Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 765.  Specifically, the 
amendment stated, “A coemployee working for the same employer is not liable for 
a personal injury incurred by another employee unless the injury resulted from 
the gross negligence of the coemployee or was intentionally inflicted by the 
coemployee.”  Id. (quoting Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 31, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. 
Sess. 1256, 1272 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5(c) (2004))).  Id. 
 142. Id.  
 143. See id. at 765–67. 
 144. Id. at 765.  See Wicken v. Morris, 527 N.W.2d 95, 98–99 (1995); Dawley v. 
Thisius, 304 Minn. 453, 455–56, 231 N.W.2d 555, 557–58 (1975). 
 145. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 765. 
 146. Id. at 765–66.  Specifically, the dissent explained, “I read the majority 
opinion to expand the personal-duty prong, and quite broadly, when it adds the 
requirement that the coemployee’s acts must be outside the course and scope of 
employment.  Such a requirement is not supported by any legislative action . . . 
[and] is not required by prior case law . . . .”  Id. 
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personal duty requirement for coemployee liability.147  But 
according to the dissent, Dawley and Wicken set forth a narrow test 
for establishing personal duty.148 
But the dissent argued that, by adding the “outside the course 
and scope of employment” requirement, the majority broadened 
the test for establishing personal duty.149  According to the dissent, 
this broadening of the personal duty prong “would have the effect, 
perhaps unintended, of providing immunity to coemployees that is 
essentially coextensive with that of the employer.”150  The dissent 
explained that if the legislature had intended to restrict 
coemployee liability or extend immunity to coemployees in the 
manner contemplated by the majority, the legislature would have 
expressly done so in amending the Act.151 
Finding no basis for the majority’s addition to the personal 
duty prong of the Wicken test, the dissent explained that, under the 
original Wicken test, it would find that Osterman and Zamberletti 
owed a personal duty to Korey Stringer.152  Proceeding to the gross 
negligence prong, the dissent explained that it found genuine 
issues of material fact as to whether Osterman and Zamberletti 
were grossly negligent.153  Accordingly, the dissent concluded that 
summary judgment granted for Osterman and Zamberletti should 
be reversed and the case remanded for trial.154 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Summary of Stringer, Questions Stringer Raises 
Stringer modified the Wicken test for determining coemployee 
liability under Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system.155  
Specifically, Stringer added a new requirement for determining 
 
 147. See id. at 767. 
 148. Id.  The narrow test for personal duty referred to by the dissent is that 
“liability must be based on a coemployee’s direct acts toward the injured employee 
and not on general actions taken in performance of the employer’s nondelegable 
duty to provide a safe workplace.”  Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 767–68. 
 153. Id. at 768. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See supra Part III.C. 
20
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when a coemployee will owe a personal duty.156  Under Stringer, a 
coemployee will not owe a personal duty unless he acted outside 
the course and scope of his employment.157  Arguably, the effect of 
Stringer is that there is now a heightened standard for establishing 
personal duty in coemployee liability cases.158  The standard is 
heightened because, for a coemployee to owe a personal duty 
under Stringer, he must have taken direct action toward the 
plaintiff-employee or have directed others to do so, and he must 
have acted outside the course and scope of his employment.159 
The Stringer court’s modification of the framework for 
determining coemployee liability naturally raises many questions.  
Perhaps most significant is whether the Stringer court’s addition to 
the personal duty prong of the Wicken test is appropriate or 
justified.  Moreover, questions remain as to how the addition of the 
course and scope of employment requirement will be interpreted 
and applied.  Further, there is a question as to what effect the 
addition will ultimately have on coemployee liability in Minnesota.  
Though subject to criticism, Stringer’s addition of the course and 
scope of employment requirement is grounded in well-established 
precedent and is justified because it serves to protect the purposes 
and benefits of Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system. 
B. Basis for Stringer’s Personal Duty Modification 
1. Judicial Basis 
Stringer’s modification of the framework for determining 
coemployee liability is consistent with relevant Minnesota case law 
concerning coemployee liability.  Dawley and Wicken established the 
framework for determining coemployee liability in Minnesota.160  
Therefore, it is important that any Minnesota court resolving an 
issue of coemployee liability formulate its holding within the 
precedents of Dawley and Wicken. 
In adding the course and scope of employment requirement, 
Stringer does not stray from the intent and reasoning of Dawley and 
Wicken.  Ensuring protection for coemployees from liability for 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 757. 
 158. Id. at 758. 
 159. See id. at 757–58. 
 160. See supra Part II.B. 
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work-related injuries was an express concern of both the Dawley and 
Wicken courts.161  Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, Dawley 
and Wicken were concerned that too freely allowing coemployee 
liability would defeat the purposes and benefits of Minnesota’s 
workers’ compensation system.162  In light of such concerns, Dawley 
and Wicken first specifically narrowed the window of coemployee 
liability so as to protect the integrity of the workers’ compensation 
system.163 
Stringer only refines further the narrow window for coemployee 
liability intended by Dawley and Wicken by expanding on their 
discussions of when a personal duty may exist.164  Dawley and Wicken 
sought to prevent coemployee liability based on a coemployee’s job 
duties.165  But Dawley’s and Wicken’s holdings that a personal duty 
may not arise out of a coemployee’s administrative responsibilities 
did not necessarily protect coemployees whose job duties involve 
direct contact with other employees.166  Stringer extended Dawley 
and Wicken by explaining that a coemployee does not owe a 
personal duty unless he acted outside the course and scope of his 
employment (i.e., a personal duty may not be based on events that 
arise out of the course and scope of a coemployee’s 
employment).167  By adding the course and scope of employment 
requirement, the Stringer court aimed to protect all coemployees 
from potential liability, including those whose job duties require 
direct contact with other employees.168 
Like Dawley and Wicken, Stringer narrowed the window of 
coemployee liability in order to maintain the integrity of 
Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system.169  Stringer’s rationale 
for further narrowing this window is consistent with the rationale 
offered by Dawley and Wicken.170  Specifically, Stringer reasoned, just 
 
 161. See Wicken v. Morris, 527 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn. 1995); Dawley v. Thisius, 
304 Minn. 453, 455–56, 231 N.W.2d 555, 557 (1975). 
 162. See Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98–99; Dawley, 304 Minn. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d 
at 557–58. 
 163. See Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98–99; Dawley, 304 Minn. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d 
at 557–58. 
 164. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 758. 
 165. See Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98–99; Dawley, 304 Minn. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d 
at 557–58. 
 166. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 756. 
 167. Id. at 757–58. 
 168. See id. at 758. 
 169. See id. at 760. 
 170. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 760; Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99; Dawley, 304 
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as Dawley and Wicken did, that maintaining a narrow window of 
coemployee liability ensures that the fundamental compromise 
upon which workers’ compensation is based is preserved and that 
the costs of work-related injuries are borne ultimately by consumers 
and not coemployees.171 
2. Legislative Basis 
Stringer’s addition of the course and scope of employment 
requirement is also consistent with legislative intent concerning 
coemployee liability.  The 1979 amendment to Minnesota’s 
Workers’ Compensation Act172 was specifically passed with intent to 
narrow the window in which coemployee liability will exist.173  The 
legislature added language to the Act stating that coemployee 
liability will exist only when a work-related injury “resulted from the 
gross negligence of the coemployee or was intentionally inflicted by 
the coemployee.”174 
The 1979 amendment indicates that the legislature intended 
for coemployee liability to exist only in narrowly defined 
circumstances.175  In deciding to narrow the window of coemployee 
liability, the legislature sought to protect the purposes and benefits 
of Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system.176  The legislature, 
like the Dawley and Wicken courts, was also seeking to maintain the 
fundamental compromise upon which workers’ compensation is 
based to ensure that the costs of work-related injuries are borne 
ultimately by consumers and not coemployees.177  It was for these 
same reasons that Stringer further narrowed the window of 
coemployee liability by adding the course and scope of 
 
Minn. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d at 557. 
 171. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 760; Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99; Dawley, 304 
Minn. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d at 557. 
 172. Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 31, 1979 Minn. Laws Extra Sess. 1272 
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5 (2004)).  See also supra 
Part II.B (discussing the act and other developments in Minnesota workers’ 
compensation law). 
 173. See supra Part II.B. 
 174. Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 31, 1979 Minn. Laws Extra Sess. 1272 
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5(c) (2004)).  The 1979 amendment 
concerning the gross negligence of a coemployee comprises the second prong of 
the Wicken test.  Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98.  See also supra Part II.B. 
 175. See supra Part II.B. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See Benanav, supra note 42, at 764; Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99; Dawley, 304 
Minn. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d at 557. 
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employment requirement.178 
C. Criticism and Defense of Stringer 
Stringer introduced language to the Wicken test for determining 
coemployee liability that was not previously used.179  The Stringer 
court was acutely cognizant of the fact that it was modifying the 
elements for establishing personal duty in coemployee liability 
cases.180  Though Stringer appears grounded in well-established 
legislative and judicial precedent, Stringer is not free from criticism. 
There is a valid concern that the court is in effect legislating 
on its own by arbitrarily adding the course and scope of 
employment requirement.  Minnesota’s workers’ compensation 
system was enacted by the Minnesota Legislature in 1913.181  
Because the workers’ compensation system exists as statutory law, 
modifications and amendments to the Act are the purview of the 
Minnesota legislature.  But interpretation of these statutes falls to 
Minnesota’s judiciary. 
The question then is whether the Stringer court was within its 
bounds in adding the course and scope of employment 
requirement.  The Stringer court of course does not purport to 
modify the statutory framework concerning coemployee liability 
established by the legislature.  What the Stringer court modified was 
its own test for determining coemployee liability within the narrow 
window for such liability as intended and outlined by the 
legislature. 
Such modification was necessary because the fact pattern in 
Stringer raised issues relating to coemployee liability that had yet to 
be fully analyzed under the Wicken test.182  In Stringer, the primary 
question was whether Osterman’s and Zamberletti’s actions toward 
Stringer were sufficient to create a personal duty, even though 
these actions were required by Osterman’s and Zamberletti’s job 
duties.183  Upon its analysis of legislative intent and judicial 
precedent concerning coemployee liability, the Stringer court 
rightly concluded that the window for such liability is to be kept 
 
 178. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 759–60. 
 179. Id. at 758. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See Act of Apr. 24, 1913, ch. 467, 1913 Minn. Laws 675 (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 176.001–.862 (2004)). 
 182. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 756. 
 183. Id. 
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narrow so as to preserve the integrity of the workers’ compensation 
system.184  But the Stringer court realized that the original Wicken test 
would likely allow a personal duty to exist under the circumstances 
presented in Stringer, which in effect would be to more freely allow 
coemployee liability.185  That is, a personal duty could be based 
solely upon a coemployee’s job duties that require direct contact 
with other employees. 
To avoid this result, and to maintain a narrow window of 
coemployee liability, the Stringer court modified its own test for 
personal duty based upon its interpretation of Dawley and Wicken.186  
The Stringer court interpreted Dawley’s and Wicken’s discussions of 
“general administrative responsibility” as “articulat[ing] essentially 
the same concept” as course and scope of employment.187  Based on 
its interpretation, the court added a new requirement that 
essentially heightened the standard for establishing a personal 
duty.188 
But as the dissent suggests, a worrisome question concerning 
Stringer is whether the majority’s interpretation of Dawley and 
Wicken is unwarranted and too expansive.189  The difference 
between Stringer and Dawley and Wicken, is that in Stringer, the 
litigation was based on coemployees’ direct actions toward another 
employee, while in Dawley and Wicken the litigation was based on 
coemployees’ administrative responsibilities over other employees.  
Preventing coemployee liability based on a coemployee’s job duties 
was a primary aim of the Dawley and Wicken courts.190  Thus, Dawley 
and Wicken held that personal duty cannot be based on a 
coemployee’s general administrative responsibilities.191 
Based on the intent of Dawley and Wicken, it is not an overly 
expansive interpretation by the Stringer court to hold that a 
personal duty cannot be based on a coemployee’s direct actions 
toward another employee that arise out of the coemployee’s job 
duties.  To hold that a personal duty exists in such circumstances 
 
 184. See id. at 758. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See id. at 757–58. 
 187. Id. at 758. 
 188. See id. at 757–58. 
 189. See id. at 765–66 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 190. See Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99; Dawley, 304 Minn. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d at 
557. 
 191. Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99; Dawley, 304 Minn. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d at 
557. 
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would be to more freely allow coemployee liability, which is directly 
contrary to the policy objectives underlying Dawley and Wicken.  
Like Dawley and Wicken, the Stringer court sought to prevent 
coemployee liability based on a coemployee’s job duties.  Thus, 
Stringer is much more a logical extension of the policy objectives of 
Dawley and Wicken than a broadly off-base interpretation. 
D. Policy Considerations Prevail 
Though Stringer may be criticized for the basis it provides in 
support of adding the course and scope of employment 
requirement, the addition is nonetheless justified by the policy 
objectives it seeks to protect.  In adding the course and scope of 
employment requirement, Stringer protects the integrity of 
Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system.  Stringer limits 
coemployee liability and the resulting shift in costs for work-related 
injuries to coemployees.  Adding the requirement ensures that 
persons whose employment involves direct contact with other 
employees will not necessarily bear a greater risk for coemployee 
liability simply because of their job duties.  As a result, persons 
whose job duties require direct contact with other employees will 
be able to work without worry that their job duties alone might put 
them at greater risk for personal liability to other employees.192 
By maintaining the narrow window of coemployee liability, 
Stringer suggests that the circumstances in which coemployee 
liability may exist will continue to be very limited.  Maintaining the 
integrity of Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system, as Stringer 
does, is important as a matter of public policy because the system 
guarantees an equitable and efficient means of compensating 
victims of work-related injuries.193 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Stringer’s addition of the course and scope of employment 
requirement does not in any sense mark a drastic new direction for 
 
 192. The Stringer court noted that persons who provide health-care services 
would, for example, be particularly well served by its addition of the course and 
scope of employment requirement.  See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 762.  As the court 
explained, “we . . . want those who provide health care services to be able to 
perform their duties and respond to emergencies without unduly worrying about 
being subject to personal liability for their acts.”  Id. 
 193. See Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99; Franke v. Fabcon, Inc., 509 N.W.2d 373, 376 
(Minn. 1993); Foley v. Honeywell, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Minn. 1992). 
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establishing coemployee personal duty.  Rather, though Stringer 
adds new language to the existing framework for determining 
coemployee liability, Stringer is consistent with the intent and 
reasoning of well-established precedent that states such liability 
should exist only in very limited circumstances. 
Because Stringer was decided a little over a year ago, there is 
not yet any real indication of how its course and scope of 
employment requirement will be treated and applied by Minnesota 
courts.  The courts hopefully will recognize and accept Stringer 
simply as a new caveat in the well-established test for determining 
coemployee liability.  Stringer’s addition to this test affirms that the 
window for coemployee liability under Minnesota’s workers’ 
compensation system will remain very narrow. 
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